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 1 
Summary 
 
During the year 2015 a large degree of attention was cast at the European 
asylum system, and especially the Dublin regulation, after an unusually 
large amount of asylum seekers managed to arrive to the EU. The Dublin 
regulation, which is the instrument that allocates responsibility for asylum 
seekers across the Member States in the EU, failed to uphold its own criteria 
and the asylum systems in certain Member State more or less collapsed. 
 
The Dublin regulation was however not originally designed to handle crisis 
situations, and had instead expressly maintained that it did not have burden 
sharing as an objective. These objectives were instead supposed to be 
handled through other means, but as time went on and no such instruments 
were adopted or used. Instead the Dublin regulation was outfitted with a 
crisis management mechanism, the Early Warning Mechanism, that was 
itself a compromise between the Commission and the Council, and aimed at 
upholding the Dublin system through administrative and economical 
assistance to pressured Member States. When this was found to not be 
enough to handle the crisis emerging due to the large amount of arrivals of 
asylum seekers, the Council adopted an ad hoc decision to relocate a 
percentage of the asylum seekers across the EU according to a distribution 
key. This relocation type mechanism is now also proposed to be included in 
the Dublin regulation. 
 
This thesis aims at examining and critically analyzing the Dublin system’s 
evolution as a crisis management system, and how the crisis management 
function interplays with the Dublin regulation’s original, primary objectives. 
The thesis main findings are that the Dublin allocation criteria may play a 
role in creating crisis situations, and that the EU legislators seems to have 
addressed this by imposing emergency relocation and support packages 
instead of addressing the systemic issues and root causes. 
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Sammanfattning 
 
Under år 2015 riktades en hög grad av uppmärksamhet mot det europeiska 
asylsystemet, och i synnerhet Dublinförordningen, efter att en ovanligt stor 
mängd asylsökande lyckats nå fram till EU:s gränser. Dublinförordningen, 
som är det instrument som fördelar ansvaret för asylsökande mellan 
medlemsstaterna i EU, lyckades inter upprätthålla kriterier och asylsystem i 
vissa medlemsstater mer eller mindre kollapsade. 
 
Dublinförordningen var dock inte ursprungligen tänkt att hantera 
krissituationer, och det hade tvärtemot uttryckligen hävdats att en solidarisk 
fördelning av ansvar inte var ett mål. Dessa mål var istället tänkta att 
hanteras genom andra instrument, men inga sådana instrument antogs eller 
användes. Istället blev Dublinförordningen utrustad med en 
krishanteringsmekanism, Mekanismen för tidig varning (the Early Warning 
Mechanism), som var en kompromiss mellan kommissionen och rådet, och 
som syftar till att upprätthålla Dublinsystemet genom administrativt och 
ekonomiskt stöd till pressade medlemsstater. När detta inte konstaterades 
vara tillräckligt för att hantera krisen som växte fram på grund av den stora 
mängden av ankommande asylsökande, antog rådet ett ad hoc-beslut att 
omfördela en procentandel av de asylsökande från vissa medlemsstater över 
hela EU enligt en fördelningsnyckel. En liknande omfördelingsmekanism 
föreslås nu också att inkorporeras i Dublinförordningen. 
 
Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka och kritiskt analysera 
Dublinsystemets evolution som ett krishanteringssystem, och hur denna roll 
samspelar med Dublinförordningens ursprungliga, primära mål. Uppsatsens 
viktigaste slutsatser är att fördelningskriterierna i Dublinförordningen kan 
spela en roll i skapandet av krissituationer, och att EU: s lagstiftare verkar 
ha hanterat kriser genom att införa akut omfördelning av asylsökande och 
stödpaket i stället för att ta itu med de systemfrågor och de bakomliggande 
orsaker som orsakat krisen. 
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Abbreviations 
 
CEAS  Common European Asylum System 
 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
EASO  European Asylum Support Office 
  
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights 
 
EU  European Union 
 
FRONTEX  European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union 
 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
 
During the year 2015, the European Union (EU) found itself having to 
handle a particularly strong debate about refugees, solidarity and legal 
avenues into the EU. The debate was sparked by unusually large arrivals of 
asylum seekers entering the Union’s borders1 and the tragic stories of 
refugees drowning in the Mediterranean while trying to reach the shores of 
Europe. The discussion was not necessarily a new one, but it reached new 
proportions and images of people trying to make their way to and through 
the EU made an impact on the political landscape. The EU legal framework 
regarding migration and asylum, and especially the Dublin system2 was now 
being discussed and criticised outside the academia and the traditional 
political circuits, as being in crisis.  
 
Alongside the general feeling of mass influx of asylum seekers into the EU 
was the difficult situation in the union’s “frontline” states, especially Italy, 
Greece and Hungary. In a series of earlier rulings from both the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) transfers according to the Dublin regulation were halted to 
Greece due to horrific conditions in the asylum system3 and a transfer of a 
family to Italy was deemed to require specific assurances to not risk 
violating human rights4. In light of these events, it is not hard to see that 
something had to be done by the EU in order to be able to maintain the so 
called Common European Asylum System (CEAS) during times of large 
arrivals of asylum seekers, and in the beginning of 2015 the European 
Commission (hereafter the Commission) published the European Agenda on 
                                                
1 See for example Eurostat News release 10 December 2015, More than 410 000 first time 
asylum seekers registered in the third quarter of 2015, link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7105334/3-10122015-AP-
EN.pdf/04886524-58f2-40e9-995d-d97520e62a0e, retrieved 2015-12-19. 
2 The Dublin system is in this thesis used as a collective term for the regulation (EU) no. 
604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person (recast) (the Dublin III-regulation) and the Regulation 
(EU) no. 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the 
establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by 
Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 (the Eurodac-regulation). 
3 Judgment in the joined cases N. S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department and M. E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, EU:C:2011:865; Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, ECHR 2011. 
4 Case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, ECHR 2014. 
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Migration5. The Agenda proposed mandatory relocation quotas for asylum 
seekers for the EU member states, both as a provisional emergency solution 
and as a permanent system to distribute responsibility for asylum seekers in 
times of unusually large arrivals of asylum seekers into the EU6. The 
provisional relocation quotas were later decided on by the Council7, and are 
being implemented during the writing of this thesis. 
 
These relocation quotas were implemented in order to handle the “refugee 
crisis” in the Member States responsible for the largest number of asylum 
applications, and to guarantee the functioning and further existence of the 
Dublin system on which the CEAS as a whole is built upon. Even though 
the Dublin system has been criticized both for its ineffectiveness and for its 
lack of solidarity, as will be seen later in the thesis, the EU legislators still 
consider it the undisputed “cornerstone” of the CEAS. In other words, even 
though Dublin is criticized for creating uneven burdens among Member 
States, it is also thought of as the tool to manage any crisis that it may help 
create.  
 
 
1.2 Purpose and research question 
 
The purpose of this graduate thesis is to explore the Dublin regulation’s role 
as a crisis management system in times of extraordinary asylum pressure, 
and to which extent this secondary role interplays with the primary 
objectives of the regulation. Through an analysis of the Dublin regulation’s 
evolution and the construction of the CEAS crisis management mechanisms, 
this thesis will offer a critical view of the Dublin regulation’s place in the 
EU asylum system in regards to asylum crisis management. 
 
To help fulfil this purpose I have chosen my main research question to be: 
• Does the Dublin III regulation’s role as an asylum crisis 
management system conflict with its primary objectives? If so, how? 
 
In order to help answer this main research question I have also chosen these 
sub-questions: 
• What are the primary objectives for the Dublin III regulation? 
• What is the Dublin III regulation’s role as an asylum crisis 
management system and how does it interact with other crisis 
management mechanisms? 
                                                
5 Communication from the Commission to the European  
Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions – A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final, 13 
May 2015. 
6 Agenda on Migration, page 4. 
7 European Council, Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing 
provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
Greece. 
 6 
 
1.3 Delimitation 
 
This thesis will not present an in-depth analysis of the practical application 
of the Dublin regulation, nor will it provide a full description of how the 
different instruments that make up the CEAS are designed and applied. The 
goal of the thesis is not to in-depth explore the legal construction of crisis 
management mechanisms, but rather to place them in a larger context and 
system that is the Dublin system and the CEAS. 
 
 
1.4 Method and material 
 
This thesis will use a traditional legal method in examining the relevant 
sources of law and present the law as it is, in order to address a problem or 
find a conflict. The analysis in the thesis will be contextual and systemic, 
and aim at presenting the Dublin system’s role in a larger system, the 
CEAS. In order to achieve this I will have to address the history and policy 
behind the system, while the exact legal application will be explained in a 
more summarised manner. 
 
The material used will consist mostly of official EU documents, both 
sources of law such as treaties, regulations and directives, but also 
preparatory works and policy documents. I will also use academic articles 
and legal doctrine in order to present arguments to be explored. 
 
 
1.5 Outline 
 
This thesis will begin with chapter 2 presenting the Dublin regulation, its 
history, objectives and evolution and its place within the Common European 
Asylum System. After that, chapter 3 will examine the crisis mechanisms 
present in the Dublin regulation and the CEAS. In chapter 4, certain 
criticism of the Dublin system that is relevant to this thesis purpose will be 
explored, and after that chapter 5 will contain the analysis part of the thesis. 
This part will examine the coherence of the crisis management system in 
regards to the CEAS as a whole and especially in regards to the Dublin 
regulation. The last part of the thesis, chapter 6, will consist of a conclusion 
of the findings and recommendations for further research. 
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1.6 Terminology 
 
The term asylum application/application for asylum will in this thesis mean 
any application for international protection, both applications following the 
Geneva Convention8 and subsidiary protection under EU law, unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
Asylum seeker will in this thesis mean any person filing an asylum 
application as defined above. 
 
The term crisis will be used a lot in this thesis. Exactly what constitutes a 
crisis is not defined by the EU legislators, but I will use it to describe 
negative situations emerging from large arrivals of asylum seekers under a 
short time in unprepared asylum systems that may risk the collapse of said 
asylum system. 
 
I will in this thesis use the name European Union/EU consistently, even 
when talking about the time when the union was called the European 
Communities/EC. This is due to the lack of importance of distinguishing the 
two for the goal of this thesis, and for the sake of clarity. 
 
Relocation means the transfer of an asylum seeker from the Member State 
which would be responsible for the asylum seekers application if the Dublin 
allocation criteria was used as normal, to another Member State. 
  
                                                
8 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 
signed in Geneva. 
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2 The history and objectives of 
the Dublin system 
 
In this chapter I describe the history and original thought behind the Dublin 
system and how the allocation of responsibility for asylum application under 
the Dublin III regulation actually works.  
 
 
2.1 The allocation of responsibility in 
Dublin III  
 
In this part of the chapter I will present the material law of the Dublin III 
regulation that concern the allocation of responsibility for examining asylum 
applications. I will not go into great detail regarding these rules, but rather 
present a general picture of how the allocation of responsibility works. 
 
The Dublin III regulation is designed around a list of hierarchical criteria for 
establishing which Member State is responsible for the examination of an 
asylum application. The regulation is, following its article 2(a), applicable to 
applicants for all sorts of international protection following from the 
Qualification Directive, both refugees according to the Geneva Convention 
and applicants for subsidiary protection. 
 
Article 3(1) of the Dublin III regulation states that a single Member State 
shall be responsible for examining an asylum application, and that this 
responsible Member State shall be determined using the criteria in chapter 3 
of the regulation. Article 7(1) states that the criteria shall be applied in the 
order they are listed in the regulation. 
 
The first criterion for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an asylum application is in article 8, and concerns 
unaccompanied minors. According the article an unaccompanied minor’s 
application for asylum should be examined by the Member State where the 
minor has family members or relatives that can provide for the minor, if this 
is in the best interests of the minor. If no such family members or relatives 
are found the Member State responsible shall be the Member State where 
the application was lodged, if this is in the best interests of the minor. Worth 
noting is also the case of MA and others9 where the European Court of 
Justice (CJEU) regarding the situation when an unaccompanied minor has 
lodged multiple asylum applications in different Member States, but does 
                                                
9 Judgment in the case of MA (C-648/11) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
EU:C:2013:367. 
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not have relatives legally present in any Member State. In these cases the 
Member State where the minor is present shall be responsible for examining 
the application for asylum. 
 
The second through fourth criteria, in articles 9 to 11, concern preserving 
family unity. According to article 9 and 10, an application for asylum 
should be examined by the Member State where the applicant has family 
members who has already been granted, respectively applied for, asylum. 
Article 11 concern cases where several family members apply for asylum 
simultaneously in a Member State and the application of the criteria in the 
regulation would lead to their separation. In these cases all the family 
members applications shall be examined by the Member State responsible 
for the largest number of their applications. If this does not determine a 
single Member State, all the family members applications shall be examined 
the by Member State responsible for the application of the oldest family 
member. 
 
The fifth criterion in article 12 concern responsibility for asylum 
applications following from issued visas or residence documents. Generally, 
the Member State which issued a visa or residence document to an applicant 
for asylum shall be responsible for the examination of the application 
according to article 12(1-2). According to article 12(3), if an applicant for 
asylum possesses more than one resident document or visa, the length of 
validity and expiry date of the documents will determine the Member State 
responsible. Article 12(4) states that responsibility for examining an asylum 
application can follow even from recently expired visas or residence 
documents, and article 12(5) regulates cases where the visas or residence 
documents were issued based on false information. 
 
Article 13 contains the sixth criterion, which is based on the irregular entry 
into the Union or stay in a Member State. According to article 13(1) the 
Member State responsible is the Member State whose border an asylum 
seeker has irregularly crossed from a third country, as long as the crossing 
took place during the last 12 months. After these 12 months the Member 
State responsible shall be the Member State where the asylum seeker has 
most recently been living for a continuous period of at least 5 months before 
lodging the application, according to article 13(2). 
 
The seventh criterion in article 14 states that if an asylum seeker enters a 
Member State, which has waived the need for a visa, then that Member 
State shall be responsible for examining the application for asylum. 
 
The eight and last criterion in article 15 concerns the case when an asylum 
application is lodged in an international transit area of an airport. In this case 
the responsibility for examining the application falls on the Member State in 
whose territory the airport is located. 
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According to data from Eurostat, around 90% of all requests to take charge 
of an asylum seeker during 2008-2012 was based on the documentation and 
entry criteria, i.e. the last criteria in the hierarchical list.10  
 
When no Member State can be designated as responsible for an asylum 
application by the criteria, article 3(2) states that the Member State in which 
the application was lodged shall be responsible.  
 
If a Member State is found to be responsible for an asylum application they 
are obligated under article 18 to either take back or take charge of the 
asylum seeker after a request from another Member State where the asylum 
seeker is located. A Member State takes charge of an asylum seeker if the 
asylum seeker has lodged an application for asylum in another Member 
State that is not the responsible state, and takes back an asylum seeker who 
has already lodged an application in the state but after that moved on to 
another Member State. 
 
After a request to take charge or take back an asylum seeker is made, the 
requested Member State have a certain time limit to respond set out in 
articles 22 and 25 respectively. If the requested state does not reply within 
this time limit the request shall be considered as accepted, according to 
articles 22(7) and 25(2). 
 
There are also two ways of acquiring the responsibility for an asylum 
application without being the Member Stated determined by the criteria, 
both in article 17 of the Dublin III regulation. The first way is the 
sovereignty clause, which allows any Member State to choose to examine 
any application lodged within it. The second way is the humanitarian 
clause, which allows any Member State to request that another Member 
State take responsibility for an asylum seekers application for humanitarian 
reasons, such as family of cultural considerations, even if that other Member 
State is not responsible following the allocation criteria. 
 
 
2.2 The objectives and history of the 
Dublin system 
 
The objectives of the Dublin system have not always been the same as it is 
today, at least not expressly. This part of the chapter will therefore aim to 
follow the Dublin regulation’s history and the different objectives it has 
been said to fulfil in order to conclude what its primary objectives are today. 
 
                                                
10 Eurostat, Dublin statistics on countries responsible for asylum application, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Dublin_statistics_on_countries_responsible_for_asylum_application, 
retrieved 2015-11-30. 
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2.2.1 Step one: The Dublin Convention 
 
The Dublin regulation of today has its roots in the Dublin Convention11, 
which was created and signed in 1990 but first entered into force in 1997.12 
The Convention contained, just as the Dublin regulation of today, a set of 
hierarchal criteria establishing the state responsible for examining asylum 
applications. The Dublin Convention was however, following from the 
definitions in its article 1, only applicable to refugees seeking asylum under 
the Geneva Convention13 and not to applicants for all forms of international 
protection as the current Dublin III regulation is.  
 
According to the preamble of the Dublin Convention, its aim was to aid in 
the creation of a European area without internal frontiers, i.e. the Schengen 
area, while guaranteeing that asylum seekers would have their applications 
examined by one of the member states. The fear was the so-called 
phenomenon of “refugees in orbit”, i.e. that asylum seekers would 
successively be sent from one member state to another without any member 
state taking the responsibility to examine their application, thereby making 
the asylum process longer and more uncertain. The preamble of the 
Convention also makes note of the objective set out in the 1989 Strasbourg 
Presidency Conclusions of harmonizing asylum policy across the member 
states, but does not further expand on how the Convention affects this 
process.14 This objective is nevertheless one of the first seeds for the idea of 
a single European asylum system. 
 
The Convention had less allocation criteria than the Dublin III regulation, 
but they were organised in the same way, i.e. in a hierarchical order of 
application. The first criterion in the Conventions article 4 was that if an 
asylum seeker had a family member that was already recognised as a 
refugee according to the Geneva Convention in another Member State, then 
that Member State should be responsible. The term family member was to 
be interpreted strictly and only as a spouse or unmarried minor child of the 
asylum seeker, or if the asylum seeker was an unmarried minor child, also 
his/her parents. The next criterion in article 5 stated that if a Member State 
had issued a residence permit or visa to an asylum seeker, then that Member 
State should be responsible, and in the article 6 criterion the Convention 
said that if an asylum seeker had entered a Member State irregularly then 
                                                
11 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum 
lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities (97/C 254/01). 
12 Eur-lex, Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for 
asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities - Dublin 
Convention, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/NOT/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01), retrieved 2015-10-30. 
13 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 
signed in Geneva. 
14 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Strasbourg, 8-9 December 1989, page 
5. 
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that Member State would be responsible. Article 7 set out rules for which 
Member State that would be responsible for asylum applications lodged in 
transit zones in airports and where the asylum seekers visa had been waived, 
and finally article 8 stated that if no other Member State was found to be 
responsible, then the Member State in which the application for asylum was 
lodged would be responsible. 
 
It is worth noting that the preamble to the Dublin Convention does not 
mention controlling entry into the territory of the member states or 
allocating responsibilities fairly as its objectives. In this regard the 
Convention claims to solely protect the rights of the asylum seekers. 
However, this must be seen in the context of the Dublin convention as a 
precondition for the Schengen agreement of free movement between 
Member States, and the benefits this would bring to the economies of the 
participating states. The claims of protecting individual rights regarding a 
fast and guaranteed examination of asylum applications may be true, but the 
fact remains that the adoption of the Schengen system benefited the border 
Member States by giving their citizens access to the EU, while the Dublin 
conventions responsibility allocation “protected” the rest of the Union from 
asylum seekers arriving through these Member States. 
 
To sum up this part of the chapter, the objectives of the Dublin Convention 
were, at least originally, to put an end to the phenomenon of “refugees in 
orbit” and to speed up the asylum process, while at the same time allow for 
a EU without internal borders. 
 
 
2.2.2 Step two: The Dublin II regulation 
(343/2003)  
 
In the years 2000 and 2001 the Commission authored two different working 
papers on the topic of the Dublin Convention and its future development. 
These working papers were written in light of the recent entry into force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam15, which mandated the creation of a EU instrument 
for allocating responsibility for examining asylum applications, and this 
instrument would become the Dublin II regulation. Another large factor to 
consider in the reform of the Dublin Convention into a EU instrument was 
the recent Tampere Conclusions, where the European Council called for the 
creation of the CEAS and the inclusion of a mechanism for allocating 
responsibility for asylum applications.16 
 
                                                
15 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340/1. 
16 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999, page 3. 
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In these working papers, the Commission admit that the general opinion is 
that the Dublin Convention had not worked as well as expected17, and that 
the Conventions role as a tool to complement the freedom of movement of 
people is limited due to the Conventions low usage18. The Commission also 
make note of the expressed objectives of the Dublin Convention, as 
described above, but after that say that “many interested parties consider 
that the Dublin Convention either has or should have certain other 
objectives”, and lists seven “possible objectives”. These objectives are:  
1. a quick asylum procedure, 
2. resolving the problem of “refugees in orbit”, 
3. preventing asylum seekers from filing multiple applications for 
asylum, 
4. creating a direct link between the success or failure of member states 
to control its borders and immigration and the allocating of 
responsibility for asylum applications, i.e. “punishing” states lacking 
in border control, 
5. preventing asylum seekers from choosing the member state in which 
they file their application for asylum, i.e. preventing “asylum 
shopping”, 
6. maintaining family unity and reuniting separated families, and 
7. to ensure equitable distribution of asylum seekers between member 
states in proportion to their capacity.19 
 
The Commission does make clear that these are only possible objectives, 
and that some of them may be incompatible with others or simply 
inappropriate or unrealistic. After examining the possible objectives, the 
Commission conclude that they consider the objectives 1, 2, 3, and 6 
appropriate and realistic objectives for a new regulation regarding the 
allocation of responsibility for asylum applications. 20 
 
Regarding the objective 4, “punishing” member states lack of border 
control, the Commission first claims that this objective is based on a 
“political choice”, and that the signatories of the Dublin Convention chose 
to link responsibility for asylum applications to the control of migration into 
the area of free movement. The Commission does however question the 
workability and effectiveness of such an objective because of the inherent 
problems of proof and evidence regarding irregular border crossings.21 The 
Commission also mentions that a certain “geographical determinism” 
comes into play regarding the number of asylum seekers entering different 
member states, and that some factors, such as diaspora communities, 
                                                
17 Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2000) 522, Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Revisiting the Dublin Convention: developing Community legislation for 
determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum 
submitted in one of the Member States, page 1. 
18 Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2001) 756, Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Evaluation of the Dublin Convention, page 3. 
19 SEC (2000) 522, page 5-6. 
20 SEC (2000) 522, page 6-11. 
21 SEC (2000) 522, page 9. 
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language and job opportunities, influences asylum seekers destination more 
than the effectiveness of the member states border control.22 
 
This objective 4 is also referred to as deflection objective in academic texts 
regarding the Dublin regulation. In a working paper for the Refugee Studies 
Center the argument is made that the Dublin regulation’s main objective is 
to deflect asylum seekers to the Member States at the EU:s external borders 
and further on to states outside of the EU. The author further argues that the 
Member States on the EU:s border have accepted this order due to being 
promised compensation in the form of financial support from the European 
Refugee Fund, administrative assistance from the EASO and FRONTEX 
and access to the free movement of the Schengen area for its citizens. By 
designing of the Dublin regulation around allocating responsibility for 
asylum applications on the basis of which Member State is to “blame” for 
the asylum seekers entry (i.e. the entry/stay criterion, see above in 2.1), the 
regulation may act as an encouragement for Member States on the external 
border to implement stricter border control and immigration policies. The 
argument has however also been made that this system has damaged the 
intra-EU solidarity by incentivising border Member States to not effectively 
enforce the regulation while also crippling the asylum systems in these 
Member States.23 
 
When it comes to objective 5, preventing “asylum shopping”, the 
Commission notes that it is quite controversial whether this even constitutes 
a problem that needs addressing, and say that the inclusion of this objective 
in a tool to allocate responsibility for asylum applications will “remain a 
matter of opinion”. In addition to this, the Commission seems confident that 
the harmonisation of asylum procedures and the approximation of 
recognition rates under the CEAS will remove at least some incentives for 
asylum seekers to choose a specific member state in which to lodge their 
applications.24 
 
The Commission dismisses objective 7, i.e. the equitable distribution of 
asylum seekers between member states, all together. The Commission 
claims that the Dublin system is “incompatible with an approach under 
which each Member State would take responsibility for a fixed proportion of 
the total number of asylum applicants in the European Union”. While 
taking note of the goal to promote “a balance of effort between Member 
States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and 
displaced persons” in article 63(2)b of the, at the time, newly adopted 
Amsterdam treaty, the Commission nevertheless does not consider this to be 
a necessary concern for the Dublin regulation. The Commission justify this 
lack of burden-sharing mechanisms in the Dublin regulation by pointing to 
the financial assistance benefiting Member States from the European 
                                                
22 SEC (2001) 756, page 18. 
23 Minos Mouzourakis, ‘We Need to Talk about Dublin’ Responsibility under the Dublin 
System as a blockage to asylum burden-sharing in the European Union, Refugee Studies 
Center, University of Oxford, December 2014, page 9-12. 
24 SEC (2000) 522, page 9-10. 
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Refugee fund, and that the issue of burden-sharing will be addressed further 
with the adoption of the Temporary Protection Directive. As a third and last 
argument for not including burden-sharing as a primary objective for the 
Dublin regulation, the Commission puts its hope to that the harmonization 
following the gradual implementation of the CEAS will remove incentives 
for asylum seekers to choose certain Member States over others when 
applying for asylum, thereby evening out the distribution between the 
Member States. The discussion in the preparatory works end on a more 
pragmatic note, with the Commission stating that political discussions 
regarding physical burden sharing, i.e. relocation, based on proportional 
distribution according to reception capacity has failed to generate agreement 
and results.25 
 
The Commission also claim that due to the relatively few transfers carried 
out according to the Dublin convention it cannot be said to put an excessive 
burden on any Member State.26 In the proposal for the new Dublin 
regulation, the Commission does however claim that the Dublin convention 
had “made it possible to mitigate the negative aspects of the unequal 
direction of the flows of asylum seekers”27, which implies that the 
Commission actually did think of the convention as a tool to more equally 
distribute asylum seekers. This part of the preamble was removed in the 
adopted Dublin II regulation, which makes no claim of aiming to distribute 
asylum seekers in a fair or equal manner across the member states. 
 
In the end, the adopted Dublin II regulation’s preamble sets out the same 
objectives as the Dublin convention, i.e. quick processing of asylum 
applications and guaranteeing access to an examination in one member 
state.28 The preservation of family unity is however more strongly 
pronounced than in the Convention.29 The preamble also talks about the 
necessity to “strike a balance between responsibility criteria in a spirit of 
solidarity”, but does not continue to flesh out the meaning of this 
statement.30 Here the Commission seems to contradict itself, as it has 
previously stated that the purpose of the regulation is not to equalize the 
number of asylum seekers across to member state in proportion to capacity, 
but rather to incentivise member states to control the external borders.  
 
The Dublin II regulation was also the first part of the CEAS that was 
envisaged in the Tampere Conclusions. The short term goals set out in the 
                                                
25 SEC (2000) 522, page 11-12. 
26 SEC (2000) 522, page 11-12. 
27 Commission of the European Communities, COM (2001) 447 final, Proposal for a 
Council Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national, preamble (5). 
28 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (Dublin II), 
preamble (4). 
29 Dublin II regulation, preamble (6) and (7). 
30 Dublin II regulation, preamble (8). 
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Tampere Conclusions regarding the CEAS was creating a clear and 
workable system for allocating responsibility for asylum seekers, and 
approximating the rules regarding reception, procedure and status 
determination. The long-term goal was even more ambitious, and called for 
the creation of a common asylum procedure leading to a uniform asylum 
status valid throughout the Union.31 The short-term goals have in a sense 
been achieved through the creation of directives regarding reception32, 
procedure33 and status determination34, while the long term goal still can be 
considered well out of reach even though it has been expressly included in 
article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
 
 
2.2.3 Step three: The Dublin III regulation 
(604/2013) 
 
In 2008 the Commission adopted a proposal for a recast of the Dublin 
regulation.35 The proposal was a part in a process of recasting all the 
directives that make up the CEAS following the Policy Plan on Asylum36 in 
order to further harmonisation and set better standards in the field of 
asylum. 
 
The Policy Plan on Asylum also makes note of the objectives of the CEAS. 
One of these objectives is said to be to create “genuine solidarity 
mechanisms”, both between Member States and between the EU and third 
                                                
31 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999, page 3. 
32 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers, which was later recast as Directive 2013/33/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the 
reception of applicants for international protection. 
33 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, which was later 
recast as Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. 
34 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted, which was later recast as Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of 
the protection granted. 
35 Commission of the European Communities, COM (2008) 820 final, Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person (Recast). 
36 Commission of the European Communities, COM (2008) 360 final, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions - Policy plan on asylum - An integrated 
approach to protection across the EU. 
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countries, in conjunction with the system for allocating responsibility for 
asylum seekers.37 The following discussion on solidarity in the Policy Plan 
on Asylum focus on the Member States that are particularly exposed to 
migrant flows due to their geographical location, and the Commission state 
that they do not believe that a new system above the Dublin system is the 
way to achieve greater solidarity. Instead, they propose joint processing, 
Dublin suspension mechanisms, expert support through the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) or intra-EU re-allocation of asylum seekers 
as possible mechanisms for handling situations where a Member State faces 
exceptional asylum pressure.38 
 
A system for suspending Dublin transfers to Member States where the 
asylum system is under particular pressure was also included in the original 
proposal for the Dublin III regulation39, but was removed and replaced with 
an Early Warning Mechanism in the final proposal and the adopted Dublin 
III regulation. This was due to remarks from the Council that such a 
suspension mechanism could create a pull factor for irregular migration and 
encourage Member States to disrespect obligations under EU law.40 The 
Early Warning Mechanism is supposed to hinder the collapse of a Member 
States asylum system during times of extraordinary asylum pressure by 
providing aid from the EASO to the Member State in question, and thereby 
preserving a feeling of trust and solidarity between Member States.41 
 
In the Green Paper on the future of the CEAS the Commission once again 
notes that the Dublin system is not designed as a “burden sharing 
instrument”, but that maybe such an instrument would be necessary. The 
Commission here favours the idea of a corrective mechanism for re-locating 
people who have already been granted protection in a Member State to 
another Member State. Even if implemented, such a mechanism would 
however not in my mind aid in easing the pressure on a Member States 
asylum system, since the re-location would take place first after a completed 
asylum process. The Commission does not address this issue, but does in a 
later part of the Green Paper suggest increasing the effectiveness of the 
European Refugee Fund (ERF).42 This may indicate that the Commission at 
the time believed that the best way to establish some sort of solidarity and 
fair sharing in the field of asylum was through financial means. 
 
The final proposal for a new Dublin regulation was based on the idea that 
Dublin II regulation was, in most concerns, well-functioning, even though it 
                                                
37 COM (2008) 360 final, page 3. 
38 COM (2008) 360 final, page 8-9. 
39 COM (2008) 820 final, article 31. 
40 European Commission, COM (2013) 416 final, Position of the Council on the adoption 
of a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining 
an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person, page 3. 
41 Dublin III regulation, preamble 22. 
42 European Commission, COM (2007) 301 final, Green Paper on the future of the 
Common European Asylum System, page 10-12. 
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had not fully created the “level playing field” it was supposed to create. The 
changes proposed for the Dublin III regulation were primarily about 
increasing the effectiveness of the Dublin system by imposing stricter 
deadlines on procedures and transfers. 
 
As can be seen above, the goal of the Dublin system has never been to 
equalise the number of asylum seekers across the Member. Instead the 
policy makers of the EU have always been on the clear with the fact that the 
Dublin system would create higher asylum pressure on certain Member 
States than other. This imbalance has even sometimes been justified by 
arguing that the Member States that receive the most asylum seekers are the 
Member States that fail to protect the EU:s external borders, as seen in the 
objectives argued for in the preparatory works for the Dublin II regulation.  
 
 
2.2.4 Conclusive remarks 
 
To conclude, the officially expressed main objectives of the Dublin 
regulation according to its creators are: 
 
• to prevent “asylum shopping”, i.e. asylum applicants choosing which 
Member State to seek asylum in, 
• to solve the problem with “refugees in orbit”, i.e. asylum applicant 
for whom no state takes responsibility, and 
• to encourage Member States to control the Unions external borders, 
and therefore control the “flow” of immigrants. 
 
As seen above, the allocation criteria has not drastically changed from the 
Dublin Convention to the Dublin III regulation, with the only large changes 
being that the Dublin III regulation has more focus on preserving family 
unity and the best interests of minors. Another difference is also that 
application both of the Convention as a whole, and in regards to the 
allocation criteria, has been made independent from the refugee status 
following from the Geneva Convention. Whereas, for example, in the 
Dublin Convention an asylum seeker should have a family member that was 
recognised as a refugee in a Member State for that Member State to be 
responsible, in the Dublin III regulation the asylum seeker shall have family 
members that are beneficiaries or applicants for any form of international 
protection in another Member State for that state to be responsible.  
 
Solidarity concerns, at least if defined as a more even sharing of 
responsibility for examining asylum applications, have not been considered 
to be most effectively addressed through the Dublin allocation system, but 
rather through corrective mechanisms and financial support. Discussions 
regarding different forms of corrective mechanisms for equalising the 
pressure on Member States asylum system have been discussed, but nothing 
as drastic as mandatory relocation quotas for asylum seekers has been 
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seriously considered previously. The EU legislators have, as seen above, put 
a lot of faith to the CEAS to harmonize asylum law and reception conditions 
throughout the Union, and that this harmonization would remove incentives 
for asylum seekers to choose specific Member States to lodge their 
applications in. However, the argument can be made both that this 
harmonization has failed to create the “level playing field” envisioned, and 
that even if it would succeed it would not aid the most pressured Member 
States on the Unions external borders since the application of the 
responsibility allocation criteria still puts them in a different position than 
other Member States. 
 
These primary objectives have proved difficult to achieve during times of 
large asylum pressure, especially in Member States situated on the Unions 
external border. In order to be able to maintain the Dublin system even 
under this kind of situation, crisis management mechanisms have been 
deemed necessary. In the current Dublin III regulation this crisis 
management mechanism is the Early Warning Mechanism. During the year 
2015, the Commission has also proposed a new crisis management 
mechanism in the Agenda on Migration43 and the proposal for an 
amendment to the Dublin regulation44, based on relocation of asylum 
seekers within the Union. Both these mechanisms will be discussed later in 
this thesis. 
 
To sum up the evolution of the Dublin system, it was created as a tool to aid 
in the creation of an area without internal borders with the Schengen 
agreement, and became the “cornerstone” of a common supra-national 
asylum system, the CEAS. While the original Dublin convention was 
supposed to address specific issues emerging from a union without internal 
borders, the Dublin III regulation is in its own preamble presented as the 
cornerstone on which to build the CEAS.45 This change of scope and 
objective for the system did come without any great re-evaluation of the 
system itself, as seen above. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
43 Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions – A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final. 
44 European Commission, COM (2015) 450 final, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a crisis relocation mechanism and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third country national or a stateless person. 
45 Dublin III regulation, preamble 7. 
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3 Crisis management 
mechanisms in the CEAS 
 
This chapter will present the mechanisms for asylum crisis management in 
the Dublin regulation and how these interplay with the primary allocation 
objectives presented in the earlier chapter of this thesis. It will also discuss 
some other asylum crisis management mechanisms and compare them to the 
ones in the Dublin regulation. 
 
 
3.1 The Early Warning Mechanism  
 
Article 33 in the Dublin III regulation contains the so called “Mechanism 
for early warning, preparedness and crisis management” (the Early Warning 
Mechanism). The mechanism was, as described above, a compromise 
between the Commission, which originally wanted a transfer suspension 
mechanism, and the Council, which feared that such a mechanism would 
create a pull factor for irregular migration and encourage Member States to 
disregard EU law. Worth noting is that article 3(2) of Dublin III contains a 
provision to stop transfers to a Member State where the transferred asylum 
seeker risks inhuman or degrading treatment due to systemic flaws in the 
Member States asylum system.  This provision does however not aim at 
supporting a pressured Member States asylum system, but rather to protect 
asylum seekers basic human rights. 
 
The Early Warning Mechanism is designed to work in three steps: 
recommendations from the Commission, a preventive action plan and a 
crisis management action plan. The process is supposed to be initiated by 
the Commission on the basis of information gathered by EASO when the 
application of the Dublin regulation “may be jeopardised due either to a 
substantiated risk of particular pressure being placed on a Member State’s 
asylum system and/or to problems in the functioning of the asylum system of 
a Member State”.  
 
The first step when the mechanism is initiated is that the Commission in 
cooperation with EASO gives recommendations to the affected Member 
State, and invites the Member State to compose a preventive action plan. 
The Member State shall inform the Council and the Commission whether it 
decides to compose this preventive action plan or not. 
 
If the Member State decides to create a preventive action plan it may call for 
the assistance of the Commission, other Member States and relevant EU 
agencies such as EASO to handle the problems or deficiencies in its asylum 
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system. The Member State shall then undertake all appropriate measures to 
address any problems in its asylum system or deal with the asylum pressure 
in order to avoid a crisis, under the monitoring of the Commission and 
Council. 
 
If the preventive action plan fails to address the deficiencies in the Member 
States asylum system or when there is a serious risk that the situation 
nevertheless develops into a crisis the Commission may request that the 
Member State within three months composes a crisis management action 
plan. This plan shall “ensure, throughout the entire process, compliance 
with the asylum acquis of the Union, in particular with the fundamental 
rights of applicants for international protection”, and its implementation 
will be monitored by the Commission. 
 
During this whole process the Council shall monitor the situation and 
provide the necessary guidance, and together with the European Parliament 
the Council shall discuss and provide guidance on appropriate solidarity 
measures. 
 
As seen above, the Early Warning Mechanism is mostly about providing 
assistance to a troubled Member State in order for it to itself repair the 
deficiencies in its asylum system and to defuse a possible crisis. It is also a 
preventive mechanism designed around stopping a crisis from developing, 
while not setting up any specific provisions on how to handle a crisis if it 
does develop anyway. 
 
In the first proposal for a crisis management mechanism the Dublin III 
regulation the Commission had proposed, as described above, a mechanism 
for suspending transfers to Member States with asylum systems under 
pressure or whose asylum systems did not live up to the standards of the 
CEAS.46 The Council did however not support such a mechanism since it 
feared that it could create a pull factor for irregular migration and 
incentivise Member States to ignore their obligations under EU law. In other 
words, their fears are that Member States would be incentivised to maintain 
asylum systems not living up to the CEAS standard in order to escape 
responsibility for asylum seekers otherwise transferred to them, and for 
asylum seekers present in those Member States would leave to other 
Member States knowing that they would not be transferred back.47 
 
The Early Warning Mechanism was the resulting compromise that the 
Council suggested, and which was adopted. It is however worth noting that 
if a Member States asylum system shows “systemic flaws” serious enough 
to risk inhuman or degrading treatment according to article 4 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights for asylum seekers, then transfers to that 
Member State need to be halted. This follows both from the international 
law principle of non-refoulement (i.e. the prohibition of sending a person to 
                                                
46 COM (2008) 820 final, article 31. 
47 COM (2013) 416 final, page 3. 
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a state where the person risks inhuman or degrading treatment) and from 
article 3(2) p. 2 of the Dublin III regulation. 
 
The Early Warning System differ from the other crisis management 
mechanisms since it does not aim to more evenly distribute responsibility 
for examining asylum applications across the Union, even in times of crisis. 
The system is more of a combined “support package” from the EU to a 
pressured Member State, conditioned on the improvement and cooperation 
of said Member State. 
 
 
3.2 Article 78(3) TFEU provisional 
measures 
 
Article 77-80 of the TFEU deal with border checks, immigration and 
asylum, and sets out the EU: s goals and visions of its common asylum 
system. Article 78 specifically deals with questions of asylum and the 
creation of the CEAS, with article 78(1) states that common asylum policy 
shall be developed and article 78(2) declaring what parts this common 
asylum system shall consist of. Article 78(3) however is not a policy or 
visionary statement, but rather a concrete mandate for the EU to act in 
certain situations. 
 
Article 78(3) TFEU states that “in the event of one or more Member States 
being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden 
inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member 
State(s) concerned”. The article thereby allows for temporary emergency 
responses to an asylum crisis situation in the Union or any of its Member 
States. As seen, the article also doesn’t limit its scope to situations 
jeopardizing the application of the Dublin regulation or any other specific 
legal system, as the Early Warning Mechanism does, but rather applies 
whenever an emergency situation emerges due to sudden asylum pressure. 
The article also allows for a very non-specified range of measures, with the 
only criteria being “provisional” and “for the benefit of the Member State(s) 
concerned”, thereby not only allowing decisions about relocation of asylum 
seekers. 
 
This article is however the basis for the provisional relocation mechanism 
adopted by the Council during 2015.48 Originally, this provisional relocation 
mechanism was planned to relocate asylum seekers from Italy, Greece and 
Hungary, which all have had difficulties operating a functioning asylum 
system due to increased arrivals of asylum seekers. Hungary did however 
                                                
48 European Council, Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing 
provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
Greece. 
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not want to take part in the relocation, and therefore only Italy and Greece 
were included as beneficiaries in the adopted decision. 
 
The decision calls for a relocation of totally 120 000 asylum seekers from 
Italy and Greece to other Member States in the union, distributed in 
accordance to a distribution key. The purpose of this relocation is to relieve 
Italy and Greece, two Member States on the external border with pressured 
and/or failing asylum systems. According to FRONTEX data cited in the 
decision, around 116 000 asylum seekers entered Italy from the start of 2015 
to the adoption of the decision in late September the same year, while the 
number of asylum seekers who entered Greece during this same time was 
around 211 000.49 
 
Only asylum seekers belonging to a nationality where the average 
proportion of granted applications for asylum at first instance in the EU is 
75% or higher shall qualify for relocation according to the decision. The 
Council justifies this by arguing that asylum applicants who are, prima 
facie, in clear need of asylum would receive full protection, swiftly in the 
Member State to which they were relocated. Asylum seekers who are 
unlikely to receive asylum should on the other hand not have their stay in 
the Union “unduly prolonged” by being relocated to another Member 
State.50 
 
The relocation decision does however, in its article 8, also place certain 
obligations on the benefiting Member States, Italy and Greece. The Member 
States shall present a roadmap including measures to improve reception 
conditions, reception capacity, and the efficiency and quality of their asylum 
systems. Failure to comply with these obligations may lead to suspension of 
the decision with regard to that Member State. 
 
In the preamble of the decision it is made clear that integration concerns 
should play a role in deciding where to relocate a specific asylum seeker. 
The decision lists family, cultural and social ties as important factors to 
consider, but does not delve deeper into how this can be achieved while still 
allocating a fixed amount of asylum seekers to each Member State.51 Some 
Member States will most likely have more asylum seekers fitting their 
“integration profile” than they have been allocated responsibility for 
according to the distribution key.  
 
 
 
                                                
49 Council Decision 2015/1601, p. 13. 
50 Council Decision 2015/1601, p. 25. 
51 Council Decision 2015/1601, preamble 34. 
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3.3 A permanent crisis relocation 
mechanism in the Dublin regulation? 
 
In 2015 the Commission proposed a new crisis management mechanism to 
be implemented into the Dublin III regulation52. The proposal is still not 
decided on, but I will nevertheless discuss it here since I believe it is an 
indication of the direction that crisis management in the Dublin system is 
heading. In the proposal the Commission calls for a permanent mechanism 
for intra-EU relocation of asylum seekers following the provisional 
emergency measures to relocate asylum seekers adopted under article 78(3). 
 
The mechanism proposed is supposed to be triggered by the Commission in 
the case of a “crisis situation jeopardizing the application of [the Dublin] 
Regulation due to extreme pressure characterised by a large and 
disproportionate inflow of third-country nationals or stateless persons, 
which places significant demands on its asylum system”. Once the 
mechanism is triggered a number of asylum seekers shall be relocated from 
the affected Member State to other Member States according to a 
distribution key. This distribution key53 is based on several criteria, such as 
gross domestic product, unemployment and population. 
 
Relocation shall only be applied to those asylum seekers who belong to a 
group where the EU-wide percentage of granted asylum at first instance is 
75% or higher, for the same reasons as cited above regarding the provisional 
relocation decision, and the number of relocated asylum seekers shall not 
exceed 40% of the affected Member States total received asylum 
applications in the six months preceding the implementation of the 
mechanism.  These relocated asylum seekers shall then have their asylum 
applications examined by the Member State to which they were relocated. 
The proposed crisis relocation mechanism also lifts the preamble concern 
for integration considerations when relocating asylum seekers directly from 
the Council decision based on article 78(3), thereby also marking that 
family, cultural or social ties shall be considered when deciding where to 
relocate.  
 
This proposed crisis relocation mechanism was envisioned in the Agenda 
for Migration as the lasting, permanent solution following the provisional 
emergency relocation under article 78(3), as said above. In the Agenda for 
Migration, the Commission states that the EU needs an automatically 
triggered, permanent system for sharing responsibility for large numbers of 
asylum applicants in clear need of protection in the case of a mass influx.54 
The proposed relocation mechanism is however not automatically triggered, 
as it needs to be triggered by the Commission.  
 
                                                
52 COM (2015) 450 final. 
53 COM (2015) 450 final, Annex 1. 
54 Agenda on Migration, page 4. 
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The crisis relocation mechanism is, as seen above, a corrective mechanism 
that spreads the asylum pressure that certain Member States experience 
across the Union as a whole. It does however not provide a total 
equalization due to the percentage caps on the number of relocated asylum 
seekers, nor does it aim to in itself improve the reception capacity of the 
most pressured Member States. It also does nothing to prevent a crisis 
situation, but is simply a corrective, emergency instrument. 
 
 
3.4 Temporary protection directive 
 
In 2001, the Temporary Protection Directive55 was adopted in the EU as a 
tool for handling situations of “mass influx” of asylum seekers into the 
Union. The directive is still in force as of 2015 although it has never been 
put to use.  
 
The preparatory works for the directive define the term “mass influx” as an 
intensified flow of asylum seekers from a specific country or geographical 
area that becomes too massive for national asylum systems to absorb. The 
Commission does state that the number of asylum seekers must be 
“substantial”, but that it is impossible to more exactly set a number that 
constitutes a “mass influx” before it happens.56 
 
The Temporary Protection Directive is built around harmonizing the 
European practice of giving out temporary protection status to displaced 
people during the wars in Yugoslavia.57 The system is designed to 
temporarily grant protection to whole groups of displaced people originating 
from the same geographical area or country in the case of a “mass influx” 
from this area or country. This group of displaced people shall then be 
granted temporary residence permits and certain other benefits by the 
Member States without the need for lodging an application for asylum. This 
is thought to ease the pressure on that Member States asylum system during 
the “mass influx”, thereby preventing a collapse of the asylum system which 
would be detrimental both to the Member State and other groups of asylum 
seekers not affected by the Temporary Protection Directives scope.58 
 
                                                
55 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures 
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and 
bearing the consequences thereof. 
56 European Commission, COM (2000) 303 final, Proposal for a Council Directive on 
minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of 
displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States 
in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, comment on article 2(d). 
57 COM (2000) 303 final, Explanatory Memorandum, 2.1-2.5. 
58 COM (2000) 303 final, Explanatory Memorandum, 1.4. 
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Member States must however allow all displaced persons who wish to lodge 
an application of asylum to do so, but the Member States can choose to 
make the temporary protection and the status of asylum seeker exclusive. If 
the Member State chooses to do so, any displaced person who also applies 
for asylum loses the rights following from the temporary protection until the 
application has been decided on. According to the preparatory works for the 
Temporary Protection Directive, this system is thought to make the 
temporary protection more attractive than seeking asylum, in order to ease 
the burden on the asylum systems of the Member States who chose to use 
it.59 The responsibility for examining any asylum applications made by 
beneficiaries of temporary protection is also not determined using the 
Dublin regulation’s criteria. Instead, according to the Temporary Protection 
Directives article 18, the Member State responsible shall be the Member 
State that has accepted the transfer of the asylum seeker into its territory. 
 
The implementation of the directive is triggered by a decision by the 
Council adopted by a qualified majority, following a proposal from the 
Commission. Once the directive has been triggered the temporary protection 
mechanism will last for two years unless aborted by another qualified 
Council decision. The Council may decide, also by a qualified majority, to 
extend the duration by another year, but after this time has passed the 
temporary protection mechanism must cease, and the general asylum laws 
shall apply again. 
 
There is a sort of solidarity mechanism built into the Temporary Protection 
Directive, based on assigning displaced people eligible for temporary 
protection to Member States in a “spirit of Community solidarity” with 
regard to the Member States reception capacity. There is also a possibility 
for Member States to voluntarily transfer beneficiaries of temporary 
protection between each other, and another provision explicitly setting out 
that measures under the directive shall benefit from support from the 
European Refugee Fund. 
 
The Temporary Protection Directive has as of this date never been triggered, 
not even during the later parts of the wars in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, which 
was the context for its creation. In the current debate of 2015 the directive 
has not been lifted officially as an alternative way to handle the asylum 
situation. The exact reason for this aversion to using the already existing 
directive as a tool to handle the current asylum situation is hard to 
determine. A possible explanation is that the political landscape can make a 
qualified Council decision difficult to achieve, especially since the 
implementation of the directive requires Member States less likely to be 
affected by asylum pressure in the first place to “share the burden” with 
Member States on the external borders. Another reason for the directives 
lack of implementation may be the fear of creating a pull factor for asylum 
seekers belonging to the group affected. True or not, this fear of attracting 
                                                
59 COM (2000) 303 final, Explanatory Memorandum, 5.7. 
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more asylum seekers to the EU seem to have been a major concern for the 
Member States.60 
 
The crisis management mechanisms in the Temporary Protection directive is 
designed to streamline the procedure for granting protection in times of 
extreme asylum pressure, in order to protect the Member States asylum 
systems to collapse. Unlike the Early Warning Mechanism in the Dublin III 
regulation, the Temporary Protection Directive does not try to repair or 
strengthen Member States asylum system in order for it to be capable of 
handling asylum pressure, but rather provides a way to sidestep it 
completely in times of crisis. The directive does however have similarities 
to the proposed relocation mechanism in that it aims to somewhat even out 
asylum pressure on Member States in proportion to reception capacity in 
times of larger asylum pressure. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusive remarks 
 
As seen above, all crisis management mechanisms except the Early Warning 
Mechanism, which focuses on supporting and repairing deficient asylum 
systems, consist of some form of relocation of asylum seekers from 
especially pressured Member States. 
 
All crisis management mechanisms presented in this chapter ties its 
application to different terms regarding the level of asylum pressure. In the 
Early Warning Mechanism the term used is “particular pressure”, in article 
78(3) it is “sudden inflow”, in the Temporary Protection Directive it is 
“mass influx” and in the newly proposed Dublin relocation mechanism the 
term used is “large and disproportionate inflow”.  None of these terms are 
defined in any detail, which raises the question if there is a difference 
between them, and if that is the case, what the difference is. A rather cynical 
reading of the divergence of terms used is that it provides the EU lawmakers 
a way to only apply the crisis management mechanism it sees fit with the 
argument that the current situation only corresponds to, for example, a 
“particular pressure” and not a “large and disproportionate inflow” or a 
“mass influx”.  
 
A noteworthy comparison can be made between the Temporary Protection 
Directive and the relocation mechanism; both the provisional mechanism 
based on article 78(3) and the proposed addition to the Dublin regulation. 
Both mechanisms are corrective and “exceptional” in nature, and aim at 
handling a crisis rather than preventing it. While a simplified temporary 
                                                
60 Has the Temporary Protection Directive Become Obsolete? An Examination of the 
Directive and its Lack of Implementation in View of the Recent Asylum Crisis in the 
Mediterranean’ in C. Bauloz, M. Ineli-Ciger, S. Singer, V. Stoyanova (eds), Seeking 
Asylum in the European Union: Selected Protection Issues Raised by the Second Phase of 
the Common Asylum System (Brill/ Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2015), page 233-236. 
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protection procedure and/or relocation may be necessary if the number of 
arriving asylum seekers become to much for Member States to handle, it 
does not solve the systemic issue of placing disproportionate burdens on 
certain Member States in the first place. 
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4 Problems and criticism of the 
Dublin system  
 
In this part of the thesis some of the criticism of the Dublin system will be 
presented. The chapter will specifically present criticism that it relevant to 
the question of whether the Dublin regulation is suitable as a, or even the, 
crisis management tool in the CEAS. 
 
 
4.1 Solidarity concerns and 
misapplication 
 
As has been described above, the Dublin III regulation was not designed as 
a burden-sharing instrument. However, article 80 TFEU sets out that all 
policy and implementation acts in the field of asylum shall be governed by 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities. According to 
the Agenda on Migration, five Member States were responsible for 72% of 
all asylum application lodged in the EU during the year of 201461, which 
clearly shows a misbalance of responsibilities.  
 
The Dublin regulation, as the main tool for allocating responsibility for 
asylum seekers, of course plays a role in creating and maintaining this 
misbalance.  
 
One common criticism against the Dublin regulation is that it puts an unfair 
burden on the Member States at the Unions external border. As described 
above, around 90% of requests to take charge of an asylum seeker were 
based on the last criteria in the Dublin regulation concerning documentation 
and entry. This large focus on the application of especially the entry 
criterion has been criticized as it creates a situation where usually only the 
Member States on the external border can be determined to be responsible 
for asylum applications, at least if the asylum seekers entry into the Union 
was documented in any way. Another criticism of the current application is 
that Member States apply much higher evidence thresholds for the family 
unity criteria than the entry criterion, and that Member States fail to or 
refuses to take information of family members in the EU into account if 
presented at any later stage of the Dublin procedure.62  This misapplication 
of the hierarchical criteria leads to a situation where the only really useable, 
effective ground for transferring responsibility for an asylum seekers 
application, from a Member States perspective, becomes the entry and 
                                                
61 Agenda on Migration, page 13. 
62 Mouzourakis, page 12-13. 
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documentation criteria, at least as long as the entry was documented in any 
way. 
 
A risk associated with this state of affairs when the entry criterion is the 
most commonly used, “default”, criterion for allocation responsibility for 
asylum applications is that it can incentivise Member States on the external 
border to not document asylum seekers entering its territory. If a Member 
States feels as if the Dublin system does not act fairly or in solidarity 
towards it, then why should that Member State give up on its own interests 
in order to protect the system or the rest of the Union? This is a large 
problem with the Dublin system of today: that it relies on the Member States 
it is most disadvantageous for in order to function. 
 
 
4.2 Ineffectiveness and costs 
 
Another regular criticism of the Dublin regulation is that it is ineffective and 
expensive to maintain. In a discussion paper made for the Greens/EFA in 
the European Parliament, the argument is made that the Dublin regulation 
fails to prevent asylum shopping and multiple applications since the actual 
transfer rate of asylum seekers to the determined responsible Member State 
is very low.63 According to statistics from EASO, covering 2008-2012, the 
number of accepted transfers under the Dublin regulation amount to about 
12% of the total amount of asylum seekers, while the number of completed 
transfers only amount to about 3% of the total amount of asylum seekers.64 
 
Even when transfers are actually carried out the effectiveness of the Dublin 
system can be doubted. In the Greens discussion paper the author shows, 
based on statistics from EUROSTAT, that transfers between Member States 
are often “cancelled out” due to Member States transferring roughly the 
same number of asylum seekers between them, for example Germany 
transferred 281 asylum seekers to Sweden, while Sweden transferred 289 
asylum seekers to Germany during 2013. This leads to a very small “net 
balance” of transferred responsibility for asylum application, but with a 
much larger economical and humanitarian cost following from often 
coercive transfers and more lengthy procedures. The discussion paper even 
makes the argument that the Dublin procedure has become so unwieldy and 
ineffective that Member States increasingly choose to not try to determine 
the responsible Member State according to Dublin, especially when the 
application is straightforward and likely to be refused. In these situations it 
may simply be faster and cheaper to examine the application in its entirety 
                                                
63 Richard Williams, Beyond Dublin – A discussion paper for the Greens/EFA in the 
European Parliament, 18 March 2015, page 9. 
64 EASO, Annual Report: Situation of Asylum in Europe 2013, July 2014, page 30. 
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and send the asylum seeker back to the country of origin if the application is 
refused.65 
 
Another side of the ineffectiveness of the Dublin system is the financial 
costs of operating this additional procedure, with its often supervised 
transfers and detention of asylum seekers. This cost is however impossible 
to evaluate, due to a lack of precise data from the Member States.66 Even if 
it is understandable that it may be difficult to separate the specific costs of 
the Dublin procedure from the general asylum procedure, it still presents a 
large problem of democratic nature. The inability to compare the costs to the 
benefits of the Dublin system makes it hard to improve or rethink. 
 
The costs of the Dublin system is however not only economical, but also 
humanitarian. By determining the Member State responsible for examining 
the asylum application, the Dublin regulation also determines where the 
asylum seeker will have to live, at least until granted freedom of movement, 
under certain conditions, from the Long Term Resident directive67 after up 
to five years. Asylum seekers who are not happy with their Member State of 
residence may engage in irregular movement, which makes hiding from the 
authorities and staying irregular necessary in order to avoid being 
transferred back to the Member State responsible for the asylum application. 
Asylum seekers also risk detention and other coercive measures as Member 
States try to identify the Member State responsible and prevent any 
secondary movements in the Union.68 This also ties in to the efficiency of 
the Dublin regulation as a whole, where processing of asylum applications 
risk becoming lengthy due to Dublin procedures and transfers of asylum 
seekers who may try to remain hidden. Thereby the Dublin system risks 
creating even more “refugees in orbit”, although in an orbit they have 
chosen themselves. 
 
This ineffectiveness and costliness of the Dublin system may also affect the 
implementation of crisis management mechanisms built upon this system. 
Fixing ineffective asylum systems is difficult, especially if there are no solid 
numbers on the costs and benefits of said system, and a slow working 
ineffective system risks triggering a crisis by itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
65 Beyond Dublin, page 9. 
66 Beyond Dublin, page 10. 
67 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents. 
68 Beyond Dublin, page 10-11. 
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4.3 Conclusive remarks 
 
The Dublin system is rightfully criticised for its lack of burden sharing and 
solidarity measures. Even tough these concerns were never considered 
primary objectives for the Dublin regulation, the fact that no other 
mechanism has been created in the CEAS to more equally allocate asylum 
seekers across the Union has forced certain Member States to take 
disproportionate large responsibility. The question has to be asked why the 
EU legislators have chosen not to include any real burden sharing 
mechanisms in the CEAS until the corrective relocation mechanism. 
 
 
As long as the Dublin regulation is considered to be the “cornerstone” of the 
CEAS and act as the foundation on which to build crisis management 
mechanisms, any lack of solidarity of ineffectiveness in the Dublin system 
risks “contaminating” those mechanisms. If the foundation of a system is 
unstable, as the Dublin regulation must be said to be, then anything built 
upon that foundation also risks the same fate. 
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5 Analysis 
 
In this analysis chapter the questions of the Dublin system’s role as a crisis 
management mechanism and, the relationship between the system’s primary 
objectives and crisis management, will be addressed. The first part of the 
chapter will discuss the Dublin regulation’s importance and role in the crisis 
management system of the CEAS, and the second part will explore the 
conflicts and interplay between the Dublin system’s primary objectives and 
the crisis management mechanisms. 
 
 
5.1 Dublin as a crisis management system 
in the CEAS 
 
This part of the chapter will discuss and analyse the role of the Dublin 
system as a crisis management mechanism in the larger system that is the 
CEAS.  
 
Firstly it has to be said that the idea of the Dublin regulation containing its 
own crisis management mechanisms is a pretty new one, with the Early 
Warning System first being incorporated in the Dublin III regulation during 
2013. During the time before this, the major crisis management mechanisms 
were the unused Temporary Protection Directive and article 78(3) TFEU. 
These other crisis management mechanisms and the Early Warning System 
does not have that much in common, with the Early Warning System 
designed to protect and aid the application of the Dublin regulation, the 
Temporary Protection Directive to rapidly ensure protection during times of 
unusually large arrivals and article 78(3) to handle other unforeseen 
emergencies. This lack of “overlapping” systems is fundamentally a good 
thing, since it gives each instrument its own focus and role that does not 
encroach on each other.  
 
However, the fact that these crisis management mechanisms operate by 
either protecting the Dublin system itself, i.e. the Early Warning System, or 
by providing exceptions to the allocation criteria in Dublin by relocating 
asylum seekers in a spirit of solidarity, as in the Temporary Protection 
Directive and the relocation mechanisms, show that the Dublin system itself 
is unable to handle unusually large arrivals of asylum seekers. The crisis 
management mechanisms exist to correct the uneven burden and extended 
ineffective procedure that the Dublin system creates for certain Member 
States, especially on the external borders. The Dublin system allocates 
larger responsibility for asylum seekers to certain Member States due to 
“geographical determinism”, as the Commission puts it. It also gives 
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asylum seekers incentives to avoid detection and registration if not satisfied 
with the reception conditions or other aspects of the Member State that 
would be responsible for the examination of their application otherwise.  
 
The EU legislators seem to be content with providing ad hoc corrective 
solutions in times of crisis, rather than to reform or rethink the Dublin 
system in its entirety. This ad hoc approach and focus on the Dublin 
regulation has also influenced the other crisis management mechanisms. 
Instead of triggering the Temporary Protection Directive, the EU chose to 
adopt a provisional relocation decision under article 78(3) TFEU, which 
gives around the same result, a relocation of asylum seekers from Member 
States on the external border to other Member States, however without the 
simplified procedure of the Temporary Protection Directive. The proposal to 
incorporate a “copy” of the relocation decision as a permanent crisis 
management mechanism in the Dublin regulation also seems to spell out the 
definitive death of the Temporary Protection Directive, and the beginning of 
the Dublin regulation as the main tool for crisis management. 
 
Another question is also whether the proposed incorporated relocation 
mechanism will get used even if it is adopted. The mechanisms scope is 
clearly already covered by the measures allowed under article 78(3), since 
the mechanisms is nearly a copy of the relocation decision, and its triggering 
still requires the Commission to “establish” that a crisis is jeopardizing the 
application of the Dublin regulation. It does of course provide for a 
possibility of shorter response times since the framework is already built 
and the distribution key is already constructed, but maybe this will also 
mean that Member States will be less willing to accept its triggering since 
they have not had the opportunity to negotiate or affect its scope at the time 
of the “crisis”. As seen with the Temporary Protection Directives lack of 
application and attention during the present “crisis” of 2015, and the EU 
legislators choice to instead adopt an ad hoc relocation scheme, established 
framework may always be what is asked for. 
 
The Dublin system was originally designed as a tool to facilitate free 
movement, in the case of the Dublin convention, and as a foundation on 
which to build the CEAS, as in the Dublin II regulation. However, the 
harmonisation of the Member States asylum systems, that the EU legislators 
relied upon for the Dublin regulation to work as a fair allocation 
mechanism, has not moved along as quickly as what was imagined. The 
Member States asylum systems still differ enough to create incentives for 
asylum seekers to choose one Member State over another when applying for 
asylum, and the corrective mechanisms that was said to be the solution for 
the unfair burden sharing has only just now been addressed via the 
relocation mechanisms, although only after crisis is a fact. 
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5.2 Conflict of objectives 
 
In this part of the thesis the Dublin system’s role as both a crisis 
management mechanism and a tool for allocating responsibility for asylum 
applications will be analysed. The question to be answered is whether the 
crisis management mechanisms in Dublin III, the Early Warning 
Mechanism, aids or conflict with the regulation’s primary objectives, i.e. if 
the system is internally coherent. The proposed implementation of a 
relocation mechanism into the Dublin regulation will also be discussed in 
this same context. 
 
As seen above in chapter 2, the expressed primary objectives for the Dublin 
III regulation is to prevent “asylum shopping”, solve the problem of 
“refugees in orbit”, and to encourage external border control and control 
of “migrant flows”. These objectives will, one by one, be analysed together 
with the crisis management mechanisms as the thesis tries to answer if they 
are aided or hindered by the mechanisms. 
 
 
5.2.1 Preventing “asylum shopping” 
 
The first objective to be discussed is the goal to prevent “asylum shopping”, 
i.e. the ability for asylum seekers to pick and choose where to lodge their 
application for asylum. As seen above in this thesis, it is not uncontroversial 
whether the phenomenon of “asylum shopping” constitutes a problem or 
not, and the Commission has reduced the question to “being a matter of 
opinion”. It is however one of the expressed objectives of the Dublin 
system. 
 
“Asylum shopping” is, of course, tightly linked to secondary movement in 
the Union, since the notion of choosing to lodge an asylum application in a 
different Member State than the one designated to you requires the applicant 
to move from that Member State to another. However, it is not always easy 
to determine what constitutes “asylum shopping”, and thereby what the 
Dublin regulation is supposed to prevent. Can, for example, an asylum 
seeker choosing to leave a Member State in order to apply for asylum in 
another Member State due to bad reception conditions or extremely lengthy 
procedure really be considered “asylum shopping” or an unjustifiable ability 
to “pick and choose” where to apply for asylum? The Dublin regulation 
does however make the answer to this question irrelevant for its application 
by simply hindering all further movement from the responsible Member 
State except in cases of “systemic flaws” risking serious human rights 
violations69, regardless of whether it can be considered “asylum shopping” 
or not. 
                                                
69 As in Dublin III regulation, article 3(2) mom. 2 
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The Early Warning Mechanism does contain certain tools to aid in 
preventing “asylum shopping”. It gives assistance through EASO and 
FRONTEX to Member States to register asylum seekers, thereby “locking” 
them to that Member State, while also somewhat removing incentives for 
asylum seekers to leave for another Member State by trying to repair asylum 
systems that do not meet the standards of the CEAS. It also somewhat 
address the issue of why an asylum seeker would prefer one Member State 
over another when it comes to asylum, at least if considering reception 
conditions as a factor when deciding where to lodge an application for 
asylum. Other considerations that asylum seekers may have, such as 
integration concerns like culture, friends and employment are however not 
addressed by the Early Warning Mechanism. 
 
The relocation mechanisms, both the provisional Council decision under 
article 78(3) and the proposed addition to the Dublin regulation doesn’t 
really help prevent “asylum shopping”. Quite on the contrary they make the 
family, cultural and social concerns a factor when deciding where to 
relocate an asylum seeker under the assumption that these factors will ease 
the integration in the Member State of relocation. Why these integration 
concerns are not considered important enough to warrant a place in the 
allocation of asylum seekers under normal conditions through the Dublin 
allocation criteria is hard to answer. One part of an answer may however be 
that the integration concerns cited in the relocation mechanisms are not 
included to benefit the asylum seekers, but rather to make Member States 
“forced” to accept them during the relocation more willing to accept them. 
An easily integrated asylum seeker, that for example already speaks the 
dominant language or has a social base in the Member State, will be able to 
enter the economy faster and thereby benefit the Member State itself. 
 
 
5.2.2 Solving the problem of “refugees in orbit” 
 
The problem with “refugees in orbit”, i.e. asylum seekers for whom no 
Member State takes responsibility, is less controversial than the issue of 
“asylum shopping”. In the end, some Member State must take responsibility 
for examining the asylum application of asylum seekers entering the EU, 
and asylum seekers falling outside the system and becoming more or less 
permanently irregular may create very negative consequences both for 
themselves and the Member States. This makes clearly designating 
responsibility to a single Member State necessary in a EU context. 
 
There is however also a definition problem to be discussed when it comes to 
“refugees in orbit”. The most basic definition for a “refugee in orbit” is an 
asylum seeker for whom no Member State takes responsibility for, while 
declaring that “some other” Member State should take responsibility. The 
definition issue however arises when considering an asylum seeker that has 
 37 
a Member State clearly designated to be responsible for its application for 
asylum, but when this Member State fails to live up to this responsibility. A 
relevant example could be an asylum seeker in a Member State with a faulty 
or overburdened asylum system that fails to properly examine the 
application for asylum. Under the current Dublin regulation this asylum 
seeker could not leave for another Member State to lodge another 
application without risking transfer back to the first, faulty Member State, at 
least as long as that Member States asylum system has “systemic flaws” 
risking certain human rights violations. There is an argument to be made 
that this asylum seeker is just as much “in orbit” as the base example, since 
the designated Member State fails to take its responsibility and the other 
Member States can refuse to take responsibility. 
 
The Early Warning Mechanism does at its core help prevent “refugees in 
orbit” since it aims to fix and assist Member States faulty asylum systems, 
thereby making the Member State able to take responsibility for asylum 
seekers who have been allocated to it. This process does however take time, 
and during that time the an asylum seekers application may be the 
responsibility of a Member State failing to properly complete an asylum 
procedure, while not allowing the asylum seeker a reliable option to make 
another Member State take responsibility.  
 
The relocation mechanisms also aids in preventing “refugees in orbit” in 
times of large asylum pressure by allowing for other Member States to 
obtain the responsibility of asylum seekers that the originally responsible 
Member State can not take care of properly. It does however, just as with 
the problem of “asylum shopping”, not address the root causes of the 
problem.  
 
 
5.2.3 Encouraging border control and 
controlling “migrant flows” 
 
The Dublin regulation is built around the Member State considered most 
responsible for an asylum seekers entry into the Union also being the 
Member State responsible for examining that asylum seekers application, 
with the exception of responsibility following from close familial ties to 
another Member State. This does in itself strongly encourage Member States 
on the external borders to control this border and try to deflect migrant 
flows, since the Member State otherwise may become responsible for any 
and all entering asylum seekers. 
 
While this “blame-based” allocation of responsibility may make Member 
States more prone to controlling the entry of possible asylum seekers into 
the Union, it may also create distrust for the Union as a whole in Member 
States of the external border, for which it may be impossible to fully control 
entry. These external border Member States will under this system receive a 
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disproportionally large share of the responsibility for examining asylum 
applications in the EU, since they are in practice the only Member States 
that can fail in controlling the external border. This may, as discussed above 
in this thesis, also result in overburdened asylum systems in these Member 
States, which in turn risks creating an asylum crisis. 
 
The Early Warning Mechanism does uphold the objective of encouraging 
border control and controlling “migrant flows” by assisting any troubled 
Member States while still applying the Dublin allocation criteria. In a 
Member State on the external border, the successful application of the Early 
Warning Mechanism may very well lead to increased numbers of asylum 
applications for which the Member State is responsible for, since the 
financial and administrative assistance can improve the border control and 
registration capacity. As the Early Warning Mechanism aims to stabilise and 
restore the application of the Dublin regulation’s allocation criteria, it may 
however put the affected Member State in a permanent state of crisis, where 
it relies upon the assistance from the Union to maintain an asylum system 
capable of handling the responsibility for its allocated asylum seekers. 
 
The relocation mechanisms do in this context aim to lift some of the burden 
from the shoulders of the pressured Member States by sharing it across the 
Union. While this may seem to at least partially lessen the incentive to 
controlling the entry of possible asylum seekers, it is important to remember 
that the relocation only affects a capped number of asylum seekers, and that 
the registration of these asylum seekers still is the responsibility for the 
original, benefiting Member State. Since the relocation mechanisms also 
call for the implementing of capacity raising measures from the Member 
State benefiting from relocation, with the threat of possible suspension of all 
relocations if not followed, the relocation mechanisms may still largely 
“protect” the rest of the EU from strong asylum pressure. As the EU as a 
whole accepts to take responsibility for a share of a more strongly pressured 
Member States asylum applications in exchange for this Member State 
increasing its efforts to raise its capacity, a sort of status quo is created 
where the pressured Member States must adopt to the Dublin regulation’s 
allocation criteria, and not the other way around. 
 
 
5.2.4 Conclusive remarks 
 
What can be seen regarding the crisis management mechanisms relation to 
the each of the Dublin regulation’s objectives is that the mechanisms very 
well may assist in upholding the objectives during times of crisis, but that 
they do not really address the circumstances that created the crisis in the 
first place.  
 
While the Early Warning Mechanism at least attempts to strengthen 
pressured asylum systems, and while the relocation mechanism diverts some 
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of the pressure to other Member States, the base allocation of responsibility 
for asylum seekers is still a factor to cause the crisis. As long as the Dublin 
regulation emphasises the entry/stay criterion so strongly the Member States 
on the Unions external borders will receive an unfairly large portion of 
responsibility for examining asylum applications, which risk leading both to 
system collapse and distrust between Member States. 
 
This problem can be described as the Dublin system only acting in a “spirit 
of solidarity” towards pressured Member States when this pressure risks 
spreading to the rest of the EU and hinder the application of the Dublin 
criteria. During times of “non-crisis”, the Dublin regulation does not, and is 
not intended to, pre-empt possible asylum system collapses in Member 
States by sharing the responsibility for asylum seekers entering the EU 
across the Union as a whole. The “solidarity” in Dublin only emerges when 
pressured Member States troubles risk spreading to the rest of the Union. In 
this way the design of the Dublin regulation’s allocation criteria can be said 
to create the need for corrective emergency measures, as the criteria do not 
accomplish “passive” equalisation of responsibility and pressure. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
To conclude this thesis the research questions chosen will once again be 
shortly answered here. Recommendations for further research in the area of 
this thesis will also be made. 
 
As seen above in this thesis, the primary objectives for the Dublin system is 
to prevent “asylum shopping”, to solve the problem with “refugees in orbit” 
and to encourage effective border control by linking responsibility for 
asylum applications to the asylum seekers entry into the Union. Burden 
sharing, although considered important, has not been seen as an objective 
for the Dublin system, but rather as something that should be addressed by 
corrective mechanisms and financial support. 
 
The Dublin system’s role in the crisis management system of the CEAS is 
hard to ascertain, since it is unsure whether such a system really exist. As 
the Temporary Protection Directive seems to have been considered 
unusable, there are only really the crisis management mechanisms built into 
Dublin, i.e. the Early Warning Mechanism, and the allowance for 
emergency, ad hoc, decisions under article 78(3) TFEU. Dublin has become 
the only predictable framework for handling asylum crisis in the EU, but it 
has done this without adapting its normal application in any way. The 
criteria for allocation responsibility for asylum applications are very similar 
in the Dublin III regulation and the original Dublin convention, with the 
only notable exception being the family reunification criteria. 
 
While the implementation of the crisis management mechanisms may assist 
in upholding the Dublin system’s objectives in certain cases, there is still the 
issue of that the root causes of asylum crisis are not fixed.  The overreliance 
on slow paced harmonisation of Member States asylum systems to fix issues 
of “asylum shopping” and secondary movement, and the lack of solidarity 
and effectiveness in the application of the Dublin system leads to the 
conclusion that the Dublin system was, and is, not prepared to prevent crisis 
situations from arising. The Dublin system has more or less become the goal 
in itself, and instead of adapting the Dublin regulation to the situation where 
especially Member States on the external border are taking a 
disproportionately large responsibility, crisis management mechanisms are 
being used to somewhat lessen the effect of the responsibility allocation. 
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